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CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY. By MAURO CAPPELLETTI &
JOSEPH M. PERILLO.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965.
Pp. xxxii, 451. Gld. 54.
Kurt H. ANadelmann t
Until recently, except for the contributions of the late Robert
Wyness Millar,' English language studies of legal procedure in civil
law countries were lacking.' A serious weakness in comparative law
work was the result, and the risk existed that, because of ignorance of
relevant procedural features, American lawyers would reach wrong
conclusions notwithstanding their knowledge of the foreign substantive law. In addition, foreign procedure merited attention in its own
right. Though "technical," and the product of local conditions, procedure should be governed by sound general policies. Comparative study
of procedure thus would yield the advantages of all comparative law
work.
Matters have begun to improve since the end of the last war.
The teaching tools used in this country for comparative law work have
emphasized the need for knowledge about procedure; the American
Journal of Comparative Law has published articles on procedure; 3
a comparative study of German civil procedure has appeared in one of
our law reviews.' But this is not all the improvement to be noted.
Prior to the last war, the American Bar had complained about difficulties in obtaining judicial assistance abroad in such matters as service
of process and taking of testimony.' The United States was the only
major country without treaties on the subject. Responding at last
to pressures, Congress, in 1958, established the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure to look into the situation.' No
t Research Scholar, Emeritus, Harvard Law School. J.U.D., Freiburgi. Br. 1921.
Lic. en droit, Paris, 1934.
1 See McMahon, It2Memoriam Robert Wyness Millar, 9 Am. J. ComP. L. 174
(1960).
2 The situation abroad has not been any better. Writings in civil law countries
on American procedure are almost non-existent. But see, Sereni, Aspetti del processo
civile negli Stati Uniti, in STtuI Di Dnzrro ComPARATo 348 (1956).
3 See, e.g., Sereni, Basic Features of Civil Procedurein Italy, 1 Am. J. ComP. L.
373 (1952).
4 Kaplan, von Mehren, & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure, 71 HARv.
L. Rzv. 1193 (1958).
6 See Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program
for Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515 (1953).
6 See Jones, Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, 8 Am. J.
Comp. L. 341 (1959).
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funds, however, were appropriated for the needed research. The
Carnegie Corporation of New York then stepped in and made a substantial grant to the Columbia University School of Law Project
on International Procedure. It was generally agreed that the international aspects of judicial assistance could not be handled properly
without better knowledge of foreign procedure in general.7 A comprehensive study of civil procedure in three countries, Sweden, Italy, and
France, was, therefore, decided upon. The volume under review is
the end product of one of these various endeavors of the Columbia
Project.'
Italian law may have been chosen for study for any of a number
of reasons. The Italian Code is of relatively recent date (in effect only
since 1942), although it is not rated as a leading one. On the other
hand, after a Germano-Austrian start, modern civil law literature on
procedure has been dominated by the contributions of Italian scholars,
some of world-wide reputation. Chiovenda, Calamandrei, Carnelutti
and Redenti are perhaps the best known, but the list does not end with
them. Furthermore, an Italian scholar, Mauro Cappelletti,' is the
leading civil law expert on English and American procedure; '0 he is
also at home in comparative constitutional law " and is one of the few
foreign scholars conscious of the constitutional requirements of civil
procedure in the United States. If Mauro Cappelletti would do the
volume on Italian procedure in conjunction with an American lawyer,
production of an outstanding work could be anticipated.
The volume under review, a joint effort of Professors Cappelletti
and Perillo,12 is just that--outstanding in every respect. Presentation in a readable way of a technical subject like procedure is not easy.
Making the subject understandable to the reader, considering the great
difference between Italian and American procedure, is an accomplishment. The authors' success may be traced to their familiarity with
the two systems and to what was apparently a happy collaboration.
The volume covers more than might be expected of a book entitled
Civil Procedure in Italy." Preceding the main part of the book,
which contains the description of the procedure proper, is a short
7 See Smit, InternationalAspects of Federal Procedure, 61 CoLum. L. REV. 1031
(1961). The Commission's work is described in its Fourth Report, reproduced in
H.R.8 Doc. No. 88, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
Another study already available is GINSBURG & Bguzius, CIVIs
(1965).
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9 Professor of Comparative Law and Director of the Institute of Comparative Law,
University of Florence.
10 His principal work is a two volume comparative study of the question of allowing parties to a law suit to testify as witnesses. CAPPELLSEMI, LA TESTIMONIANZA
DELLA PARTE NEL SISTEMA DELI: oRALrrA (1962).
11 See Cappelletti & Adams, JudicialReview of Legislation: EuropeanAntecedents
and Adaptations, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1207 (1966).
12
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University.
18 The same can be said of all the volumes produced under the direction of Professor Hans Smit as part of the Columbia Project Series.
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chapter on the political history of Italy, followed by a chapter on the
history of Italian civil procedure starting with Roman law. Chapters
of general interest on the legal profession and the organization of the
courts come next. In the main part of the book, all stages of procedure are described for all levels of the judicial system. A chapter on
enforcement of judgments is also included. The book closes with a
chapter on judicial assistance 4 and a number of sample documents
appear in the appendix. The "international" features, jurisdiction,
recognition of foreign judgments, and judicial assistance, are presented
with special care.
The volume is more than simply a good summary statement of
the Code rules with references to the Commentaries, other literature
and case law. The approach is critical throughout, and the authors
have much to say about deficiencies in the present law. 5 The emphasis
is on practical consequences, and the authors avoid mere doctrinal
argumentation, which is often found to excess in Italian writings."0
As is the case with a great many codes of procedure, the Italian Code
of 1942 has not yet been brought entirely into line with modem thinking. The courts have no rule-making power and law reform is slow.
Italian procedure appears to be more complicated and less to the point
than procedure in the United States federal courts, without securing
better results. Of course, what may serve litigation well in the United
States, may be unsuitable for foreign litigation shaped by differing
environment and tradition.
The American lawyer who is following litigation in the Italian
courts will find the volume most valuable. Similarly, the lawyer facing
conflicts problems of a jurisdictional nature will get much help from
the chapters on assumption of jurisdiction (Pp. 85-94) ,'1 recognition
of foreign and ecclesiastical judgments (Pp. 367-95),' and judicial
assistance (Pp. 396-423).
14 The authors of the instant work have also authored the chapter on Italy in
247 (Smit ed. 1965).
S According to the authors, the principal weaknesses are an excess of abstractly
fixed peremptory stages; lack of machinery to implement the principle of orality;
lack of adequate discovery powers; hearing of evidence by one judge, rather than the
full panel; and improper interference with the principle of free evaluation of evidence
(see pp. 44-45). Amendments passed in 1950 have done little to remove these deficiencies (see p. 46). Appeal of judgments is encouraged by the rule that, in general,
judgments of the first instance cannot be enforced before the appeal has been decided
or the time for appeal has lapsed (see pp. 256-57).
16 The authors note that the abstract reporting of decisions has encouraged excessive concern with abstract legal arguments with too little attention being given
to the facts of cases (see p. 272 n.115). On weaknesses in reporting, see generally
Gorla, Lo studio interno e comparativo della giurisprudenza e suoi Premuposti: le
tecniche per la interpretazione delle sentenze, [1964] FORO ITALiANO V. 73; also in
INTERNATi NAL Co-opamATOmN IN LrIGATi N: EUROPE
1

GORLA, RACCOLTA DI SAGGI SULL' INTERPRETAZIONE
GIUDIZIALE IN ITALIA (1966).

E SUL VALORE DEL PRECEDENTE

CivInE art. 4 (1942).
Is Discussing CODICE DI PRocED RA Civrr arts. 796-801 (1942).
3t Discussing CODICE DI PROCEDURA
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Italian law is considered among the more liberal, as far as international cooperation is concerned, and this certainly applies to technical
judicial assistance. In other areas, the picture is not as favorable.
With respect to the assumption of jurisdiction over aliens, none of
the improper fora of the French and German varieties (jurisdiction
based on plaintiff's nationality and judgment in personam on the basis
of mere presence of assets) '1are used in Italy. Service of process on
an alien temporarily in Italy is sanctioned only on a retaliation basis
(P. 89) ° But jurisdiction can be obtained for the impleading of
guarantors without any of the limitations set by due process (P. 88).21
For resident Italians, the Code has rules restricting forum selection agreements 2 2 which go beyond the standards agreed upon in international conventions. 3 Similarly, the Code interferes with normal
commercial arbitration by establishing a nationality requirement for
arbitrators (Pp. 91, 362).2
Conclusion of treaties is necessary to
25
overrule the requirement.

Recognition of foreign judgments seemingly is regulated in a
liberal way, but this is not the full picture, as is duly pointed out in the
book. Out of concern over the effects in Italy (a non-divorce country)
of divorces granted abroad to Italians, the Code requires formal recognition proceedings for all foreign judgments without distinguishing
between judgments in status matters and other judgments (Pp.
367-69) .26 This is an unnecessary complication when no enforcement
is involved. The rules on grant of conclusive effect are open-minded
but they can be evaded easily. One way is to start proceedings in the
Italian courts before the foreign judgment becomes "final" in the
27
Italian sense; that is, before the time for an appeal has run out.

Another method of evasion is non-appearance on the part of the defendant in the foreign court, in which case reexamination on the merits is
allowed (P. 382) .21 Recognition and enforcement of foreign judg19 See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 321 (Nadelmann, von Mehren, & Hazard, eds., 1961).
20 Discussing CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIViLE art. 4(4) (1942).

Discussing CODIcE
22Under the CODICE

CivilE art. 4(3) (1942).
CVlLE art. 2 (1942), such an agreement by
an Italian selecting a forum abroad is not valid unless the Italian is without domicile
or residence in Italy and the agreement is with an alien (p. 374).
23 See the Hague Convention of Nov. 25, 1965 on the Choice of Court, Hague
Conference on Private Internatioial Law, Tenth Session, 13 Am. J. Coup. L. 615,
629 (1964) : article 2 allows a reservation but limited to where both parties to the
forum agreement are nationals and residents of the state using the reservation.
24 CODICE DI PRoCEnURA CIviLE art. 812 (1942).
25 For arbitration agreements betveen Italian and United States citizens the
requirement is removed by the Agreement of Sept. 26, 1951, Supplementing the Treaty
of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation of Feb. 2, 1948, 12 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S.
No. 4685 (p. 389 n.117). Cross-references should have been made at pp. 91 and 362.
26 The prevailing view was challenged recently. See Cappelletti, II valore delle
sentenze straniere in Italia, 20 RIViSTA DI DIRITTo PROCESSUALE 192 (1965).
27 This "routine" is discussed at p. 378.
28 CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIViLE art. 798(1).
21
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ments enforceable where rendered is hindered by the requirement that
the foreign judgment must no longer be subject to the ordinary means
of review (including appeal) (P. 382).29 These rules are in contrast
with the more suitable rules in the treaties on enforcement of foreign
judgments which have been concluded by Italy with foreign countries.3 °
Generally speaking, a lack of flexibility in the codified rules is
noticeable. One is reminded of the conflicts rule in the Italian Civil
Code generally ruling out renvoi. 31 Might this be a characteristic
of Italian conflicts law?
The book's final chapter, "International Co-Operation in Litigation," discusses as the last item "Proof of Foreign Law (in the Italian
Courts)" (P. 421).32 Clearly, this important item should have been
included in the chapter on evidence, "The Proof-Taking State" (P.
173). Not even a cross-reference is provided, and the rather poor
subject matter index does not remedy the omission. Otherwise, the
organization of the work is excellent, and this includes the technical
side.33
Professors Cappeletti and Perillo have made an outstanding contribution to the American literature on foreign procedure and conflicts
law. A correspondingly valuable contribution to Italian legal knowledge by production of a parallel volume on American procedure is
hopefully suggested. A dialogue between specialists in the two countries would thus be made possible to their mutual advantage.
29 CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVLE art.

797(4).

30 References to the treaty law are to be found in notes 144-47, at pp. 393-94.

The Treaty between Belgium and Italy, of April 6, 1962, 47 RIVISTA DI DIRITro
INTERNAZIONALE 137 (1964), should be added.
31 CODICE CIVlLE Preliminary Provisions art. 30 (1942).
For an example of
difficulties created, see De Nova, Conflict of Laws and Functionally Restricted Sub-

stantive Rules, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1569 (1966).

32 For fuller treatment, see Capelletti, II trattamento del diritto straniero nel

processo italiano, 49 RvISTADi Dirrro INTRNAZIONALE 299 (1966).
33We

spotted an error in note 152, at pp. 38-39: "Mf. Rauter" should read

". F. Ranter."
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CHIEF JUSTICE: THE JUDICIAL WORLD OF CHARLES
DOE.

By JoHN PHILLIP REID.

sity Press, 1967.

Cambridge: Harvard Univer-

Pp. xii, 489. $12.50.
Willard Hurst t

Charles Doe, admitted to the bar in 1854. was appointed an Associate Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire in
1859. The duties of the office included both trial and appellate work;
the judges took turns presiding at trials in each of the state's counties.
Doe earned his appointment by campaigning briefly, but vigorously,
for the new Republican party, after renouncing his former allegiance
to the Democrats, because they had become spokesmen for southern
interests. The Democrats recaptured the state in 1874, and, on the
pretext of reorganizing the judicial system into separate trial and
appellate functions, they legislated Doe out of his job. The Republicans
took the state again in 1876. Speaking for an independent bench, Doe
was one of the few among the victors to advocate leaving the Democratic court undisturbed. But the Republicans restored the former
court organization, and Doe acceded to strong pressure to accept appointment as Chief Justice, a position in which he served from 1876
until his death in 1896.
Until the appearance of this full dress biography by Professor
John Reid of New York University School of Law, Charles Doe owed
his place in our legal history almost wholly to the praises of Roscoe
Pound. Pound described Doe as the one state court judge who stood
out as a law maker in the years from the Civil War to the early 20th
century,' and he placed Doe in his pantheon of the ten greatest judges
in our history.2 John Reid, by a careful search of sources and by
looking imaginatively at his subject from a variety of perspectives,
has now provided material from which we can estimate for ourselves
Doe's title to the honor Pound paid him. The result, however, is substantially to disprove that title. Mediocrity and dullness abound more
in this world than do the ,excitement of creative will and individual
flare, and thus we properly hold in high esteem a man who brings bold
style to his work. But while Doe had style-indeed, to a degree bordering on idiosyncracy-Reid's comprehensive inventory shows a want of
substance in Doe's life work. Style is not enough for a great appellate
judge. We ask from him also analytical insight, sturdy generalization,
t Vilas Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A., Williams College, 1932.
LL.B., Harvard, 1935. Member, Illinois and Wisconsin Bars.
1 Pound, The Place of Jitdge Story in the Making of American Law, 1 MASS.

L.Q. 121, 134 (1916).

2
2 POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA oF AMFRICAN LAW 4, 30-31 & n. .
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and the resolving of fuzzy or question-begging propositions into concepts that command reasoned respect. What John Reid's dispassionate
account of Doe shows to me is more naivet6 than insight, generalizations which fragment rather than tie together the operations of law,
and concepts which only replace other men's fuzziness and begged
questions with Doe's own.
This is a biography of a man of ideas. Suffering the frustration
of many legal biographers, Reid has been unable to find any substantial
material to illuminate Doe's few years in practice; what he has found
is routine. Before he went on the bench, Doe was active in New Hampshire party affairs, and with suitable decorum he paid some attention
to politics while he was a judge. But politics was not a major element
in Doe's career, although Reid's book will add perspective for those
who have enjoyed the American Winston Churchill's novels of political
maneuvering in New Hampshire in the late Jacksonian period and in
the turn-of-the-century years of the railroad lobbies. Nor did trial
work bulk large in his total service, though New Hampshire's judicial
organization required that Doe sit as a nisi prius judge in addition to
his appellate duties. Tired and bored with trial service, Doe threatened
to resign soon after he became Chief Justice in order to escape the
burden. His colleagues were able to persuade him to remain only by
undertaking themselves to do his trial stint.
The area of Doe's greatest contribution was the judicial reform
of procedure; his key principle was that no right be left without a
remedy, and that-within the frame of constitutionally guaranteed
rights-procedure serve substantive policy. He insisted that the forms
of action not be treated as defining the whole content of the law. Thus
he persuaded his colleagues to approve the amendment of a declaration
to change the form of action, and he would permit any declaration at
law to be amended to stand as a bill in equity, or vice versa, when
the development of a case showed the change to be appropriate (Pp.
98, 100). With such flexibility, the New Hampshire court under Doe
showed that a state could accomplish broad reform of judicial procedure without the need of legislation.
Confident that he and his colleagues had the knowledge and wisdom to see where community good lay, Doe also led his court to assert
broad discretion in law-making apart from reform of judicial procedure.
He paid tribute to the importance of the separation of powers, but no
one was readier to see judges legislate, not just interstitially, but in
broad sweep. He would not even confine judicial law makers by their
own traditions; he preferred growth to any close regard for precedent.
A notable example of his law-making was his court's rejection of the
confines of the M'Naghten rules, and its determination that the defense
of insanity in a criminal proceeding might be established by proper
proof of any kind of mental disease producing the offending conduct,
without freezing into law any one medical theory (Pp. 117-18).
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However, Reid's treatment shows that there were basic inconsistencies in Doe as a judicial law-maker. Doe held no reforming
principle more fundamental than his insistence that there existed too
many straitjacketing rules of law, and too little cognizance that many
questions which courts must answer were questions of fact and not of
law. Perhaps Doe was groping towards the emphasis on the functional
aspects of law which a later philosophy of legal realism would develop.
We sense this when he criticizes the proliferation of presumptions in
evidence and the multiplication of dogmatic rules for construing documents. What Doe did not see-or at least did not acknowledge-was
that in treating insanity or negligence as questions of "fact," he was
implicitly lumping together the determination of value-neutral propositions about existence and the making of value choices about socially
acceptable or useful behavior. Doe's "fact" approach, in effect, abdicated a legitimate and necessary responsibility of law makers. It is
the law's business to generalize from like situations and to define and
rank in a rational hierarchy the value choices which must be made if
a society is to have the structure it needs to function as a society. At
odds with his "fact" emphasis, moreover, was Doe's declared view
that the courts were guided by common law principles or "American
principles" which he left without definition or functional justification.
Further, despite his emphasis on constitutional limits, Doe seems not
to have seen that generalized standards and rules help restrict public
officers to responsible uses of power.
John Reid plainly likes the unpretentious, stubbornly individualistic Yankee judge whom he has studied so long and closely. But he
has also kept a scholar's detachment. Reid concludes that, despite
his bold willingness to innovate, Doe had little influence on the development of the law outside New Hampshire. Perhaps the one area
in which he exerted a general influence was in helping develop a more
pragmatic, flexible attitude towards court procedure. His technique
of reform through judicial decision, however, was not widely copied,
for procedural reform elsewhere was carried out primarily by legislatures and committees. Reid finds the Chief Justice guilty of philosophical naivet6 in his failure to define the concepts of "justice" and
"reason" which he invoked, or the concept of "fact" which was so
central to his reforms. Reid sprinkles these critical judgments throughout his book, and his material supports them at point after point. I
wish that he had better integrated his critical comments in his summation, for the book also praises Doe with a vigor which seems at odds
with the criticisms. Nonetheless, Professor Reid has put the reader
in possession of material from which he can make his own over-all
judgment. Most will conclude that Doe belongs in New Hampshire's
hall of fame, but not in the national shrine in which Dean Pound
placed him.

